Empathic perspective-taking is inevitably described using spatial locatives ("understanding a point of view") and involves a metaphorical "merging of the self and other." Visuo-spatial perspective-taking involves an actual embodied merging of the self and other. yet, the two kinds of perspective-taking are treated as independent of each other. four studies found that these two kinds of perspective-taking are related on a dispositional level. Individuals with high levels of empathic perspective-taking were better at imagining different views of the same object (Studies 1-3). This correlation could not be explained by general intelligence (Study 2) and was nominally stronger among participants who explicitly reported that they engaged in spatial perspective-taking (Study 3). Study 4 showed a correlation between empathic perspective-taking and performance on another spatial perspective-taking task. These relations can be explained by a shared mechanism of embodied self-rotation during all kinds of perspective-taking.
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Empathic perspective-taking is inevitably described using spatial locatives ("understanding a point of view") and involves a metaphorical "merging of the self and other." Visuo-spatial perspective-taking involves an actual embodied merging of the self and other. yet, the two kinds of perspective-taking are treated as independent of each other. four studies found that these two kinds of perspective-taking are related on a dispositional level. Individuals with high levels of empathic perspective-taking were better at imagining different views of the same object (Studies 1-3). This correlation could not be explained by general intelligence (Study 2) and was nominally stronger among participants who explicitly reported that they engaged in spatial perspective-taking (Study 3). Study 4 showed a correlation between empathic perspective-taking and performance on another spatial perspective-taking task. These relations can be explained by a shared mechanism of embodied self-rotation during all kinds of perspective-taking.
Being able to tune into the thoughts and feelings of our interaction partners is a main component of empathy (i.e., perspective-taking; Davis, 1983) and an important aspect of social life. But what does it take to be empathic? It seems to involve spatial perspective taking, since in linguistic metaphors we cannot speak about empathizing without using spatial locatives, such as when we "put ourselves into another person's shoes" or understand a "point of view" (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) . Thus, simulations of another psychological perspective might be grounded in visual simulations of perspective (cf. Barsalou, 1999) . From a functional perspective, this assumption makes sense as well: both empathic (Batson, Sager, et al., 1997; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005) and visuo-spatial perspective-taking (Michelon & Zacks, 2006; Zacks & Michelon, 2005; Zacks, Vettel, & Michelon, 2003) hinge on establishing a common reference frame to simulate a mental state within another person. To empathize we need to simulate "how something feels" and for visuo-spatial perspectivetaking we need to simulate "how something looks" (Level-2 perspectivetaking; cf. Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981) for another person.
This functional similarity raises the question whether these simulations also share a common mechanism. The underlying processes of spatial perspective-taking have been demonstrated most clearly by Kessler and Thomson (2010) . When adopting the spatial perspective of another person, people transform their body schema into the target's perspective-literally putting their body in the target's place. Consequently, by physically rotating the perspective-taker toward or away from the target, spatial perspective-taking becomes easier or more difficult. Therefore, spatial perspective taking is a strongly embodied process (cf. Kessler & Rutherford, 2010; Kessler & Thomson, 2010 ; for the general notion of embodiment see, e.g., Glenberg, 2010; Topolinski, 2010; Topolinski & Strack, 2009 . Note that this process is also employed during level-2 visual perspective-taking (see Surtees, Apperly, & Samson, 2013a , 2013b , which is why these terms are used interchangeably in the present context.
Although the mechanisms of spatial perspective-taking have been thoroughly investigated, only little is known about its psychological consequences. However, previous research also hints at a link between visuospatial and psychological or empathic forms of perspective-taking. For instance, visuo-spatial perspective-taking and social skills, a measure of general empathic functioning (exemplary item: "I enjoy social occasions"; cf. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) , are positively correlated (e.g., Brunyé et al., 2012; Shelton, Clements-Stephens, Lam, Pak, & Murray, 2012; Thakkar, Brugger, & Park, 2009 ). Furthermore, autism spectrum disorder-an extreme case of social and empathic dysfunction-has been associated with deficits in visuo-spatial perspectivetaking (Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2009 ). Finally, differences in social skills predict how spatial perspective problems are approached (Kessler & Wang, 2012) . People with low social skills engage in the abovementioned embodied transformation during spatial perspective-taking only to a lesser degree. Therefore, for people with low social skills, these tasks could be embodied differently (e.g., as the rotation of only some parts of the body), they could be solved by object-rotation rather than mental self-rotation strategies, or completely rule-based strategies. This research demonstrates a link between generally high functioning empathy and visuo-spatial perspective-taking skills. It does not, however, speak to the relation between different kinds of perspective-taking, although it seems plausible to assume that empathic perspective-taking also contributes to high social skills.
For empathic perspective-taking the research landscape looks diametrically different. The effects of empathic perspective-taking have received ample empirical attention but relatively little is known about their underlying mechanisms. In empathic perspective-taking research, participants usually learn about a fictional character and then are instructed to "please imagine how [the target] feels. Try to take her perspective in the interview, imagining how she is feeling about what is happening. While you watch and listen to her, picture to yourself just how she feels. In your mind's eye, visualize clearly and vividly her reactions in this situation" (the imaginetarget/other instruction; for other instructions, see Davis et al., 2004 Davis et al., , p. 1628 ; see also Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997) . It has been shown that such instructions lead to a plethora of important social outcomes. For instance, perspective-taking leads to increased prosocial behavior (e.g., Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002) or decreased prejudices (e.g., Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) , and most importantly the adjustment of own thoughts (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004) , feelings (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997) , or even the view of oneself (Galinsky, Wang, & Ku, 2008) toward those of the perspective-taking target. As the main mechanism of psychological perspective-taking effects, a "merging between the self and the other" is assumed (see, e.g., Davis et al., 1996) .
One important limitation of such experiments is that they all focus on outcomes that are measured after perspective-taking allegedly occurred. This is not to say that these works do not focus on underlying mechanisms of perspective-taking in some way, but to put it more accurately, they focus on the underlying mechanisms, which are engaged once perspective-taking occurred. This leaves the important question of what actually happens while we imagine a different psychological perspective completely unanswered. For instance, a seminal chapter by Epley and Caruso (2009) describes this initial step simply as "activating perspective-taking" (p. 298), focusing on why or why not people engage in perspective-taking, while the important question of how we adopt the psychological perspective of another remains untapped. The same is true for the social skills measure (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001 ) which measures empathic functioning in general, but does not speak to the processes engaged within a specific empathic perspective-taking episode. The present work seeks to shed light on the underlying mechanisms of psychological perspective simulations per se, and not the psychological trickle-down consequences of these processes.
Although the conceptual metaphor would suggest so, the embodied selfother merging that happens during spatial perspective-taking has never been related to psychological self-other merging in empathic perspective-taking. Rather, visual and empathic perspective-taking are strongly differentiated in social psychology. It is argued that although both kinds of perspective-taking often make parallel predictions, they are subserved by different mechanisms (Libby & Eibach, 2011, p. 225f) . Indeed, there exists one paper showing that instructions to engage in visual versus empathic perspective-taking can lead to different outcomes on the same measure (Fiske, Taylor, Etcoff, & Laufer, 1979) .
Much like in empathic perspective-taking research, participants are instructed to take different perspectives in social psychological research on visual perspective-taking, too (cf. Libby & Eibach, 2011, p. 189 ; see also Kross & Ayduk, 2011) . A large body of research demonstrated that imagining events from a different visual perspective can change representations of these events (Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009) , emotions (Valenti, Libby, & Eibach, 2011) , and even behavior (Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 2007) . Although these effects are framed as specific to the visual aspects of the simulation, they are not related to the visual perspective-taking mechanisms established in cognitive psychology (Kessler & Thomson, 2010) and the question of what actually happens during the simulation process remains unanswered again. Even Fiske et al. (1979) state in their general discussion: "the question remains open, that is, whether role-taking in general combines aspects of both imaging and empathy" (Fiske et al., 1979, p. 374) . We agree with this conclusion and would like to add that it is a very strong assertion that instructions such as "take a perspective in a situation," "picture to yourself how somebody feels," or "in your mind's eye, visualize clearly and vividly somebody's reactions in a situation" are not supplemented by any visual input whatsoever. It is an assumption, for which direct evidence is lacking, too.
While we agree that different perspective-taking instructions can lead to different outcomes on the same task (cf. Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Fiske et al., 1979) , we argue that the distinction between empathic and visual perspective-taking mechanisms in social psychology is premature. These presently used instruction manipulations are unable to tease visual and psychological simulation aspects apart and it seems quite impossible to instruct a person to "only imagine visual, but not psychological aspects of another person" or vice versa. We argue that simulations of both psychological and visual perspectives rely on embodied transformations of the self into the other's position (cf. Kessler & Rutherford, 2010; Kessler & Thomson, 2010) . This embodied self-rotation is one mechanism, which quite literally contributes to the "merging of the self and other," which is presumably the main mechanism behind empathic perspective-taking effects (see, e.g., Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowlands, 2002; Batson, Polycarpou, Harmon-Jones, Imhoff, Mitchener, Bednar et al., 1997; Batson, Sager, Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky, & Dawson, 1997; Davis et al., 1996) . Since this mechanism is shared between the two kinds of perspective-taking, visuo-spatial and empathic perspective-taking correlate on a dispositional level.
daTa analySiS
For Study 1, sample size was determined heuristically since the expected effect size was unknown. We ran the study as part of a data collection campaign that was scheduled to gather N = 120 participants; N = 115 showed up. For the remainder, we determined sample sizes with a priori power analyses using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) targeting a power of (1-β) = .80 in a one-tailed test based on the effect of Study 1. For Studies 2 and 3 this amounted to N = 144 participants. Study 4 was a reanalysis of an existing dataset. All exclusion criteria and measures used are disclosed. All psychometric tests were analyzed according to their respective manuals (cf. Liepmann, 2007; Stumpf & Fay, 1983) . Although our hypotheses are clearly one-tailed, reported p-values correspond to two-tailed tests (as per convention).
STudy 1
The first study was designed to test our general hypothesis. As a measure of empathic perspective-taking, we used the German version (Paulus, 2009 ) of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) . This scale is a multidimensional approach to empathy, comprising three emotional subscales-Empathic Concern (EC; e.g., "I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me"), Fantasy (FS; "I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me"), and Personal Distress (PD; "In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease")-as well as one cognitive subscale, Perspective-Taking (PT; "I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective"). The IRI is the most frequently used measure of empathy for which a validated German translation exists. Furthermore, its factorial structure makes it possible to establish concurrent validity (i.e., a correlation between empathic and visuo-spatial perspective-taking), while simultaneously showing discriminant validity toward the other subscales of empathy.
PT was the focal dependent variable in the present studies. This cognitive subscale refers to the willingness or frequency with which participants engage in empathic perspective-taking in everyday life. The original author of the IRI considered PT as a measure of both motivation and skill to engage in empathic perspective-taking (Davis, 1983, p. 115) , although the items arguably refer more closely to the motivational aspects of empathy. Compared to this, prior research has focused on measures related to empathic "performance" (i.e., social skills, cf. Baron-Cohen et al., 2001 ). This measure, however, describes successful empathic adjustment overall, which can come about by means different from perspective-taking. PT as a measure of perspective taking in particular comes much closer to the idea of embodied self-other merging. Furthermore, prior research has shown that motivation for accurate empathic perspective-taking eliminates performance differences between individuals with allegedly high versus low empathic accuracy (see, e.g., Hall & Schmid Mast, 2008; Klein & Hodges, 2001) . Finally, in general, skill and motivation usually are highly correlated and this should feed into the interpretation of the PT items. Therefore, the subscale PT was deemed more appropriate for the present research question than the social skills subscale of the Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001 ), although such a measure likely contributes independently to the relation between empathic and visuo-spatial perspective-taking.
Both empathic concern and personal distress describe feelings, which follow from empathic perspective-taking. These subscales are often of interest in studies looking at the consequences of perspective-taking, for instance on the distinction between imagine-self and imagine-other empathizing instructions (see, e.g., Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Davis et al., 2004; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007) . The focus of the present work is the simulation preceding such consequences, and this should correlate to the cognitive aspect of empathy, as indicated by the subscale PT and not these emotional facets of empathy, which are temporally subsequent (the same is true for, e.g., the social skills subscale of the Autism Quotient, see BaronCohen et al., 2001) .
The subscale Fantasy arguably comes closer to PT than empathic concern and personal distress. However, not by coincidence, it is also conceptualized as a facet of affective empathy, which is contrasted to cognitive empathy (i.e., PT) in the IRI (see Davis, 1980 Davis, , 1983 . The ability to appreciate the character of the protagonist in a movie or book differs in at least three important regards from everyday perspective-taking. First, whereas perspective-taking is a cognitively demanding process, narrative transportation is more experiential. People actively try to understand another person, but they are passively drawn into an elegant narrative. Second, and related, perspective-taking happens in the here and now-the real world. Fantasizing, on the other hand, refers to imagining oneself into another alternative world and being aware of this. Third, perspective-taking depends solely on the perspective-taker and the target of perspective taking, whereas fantasizing necessarily is also a function of the surrounding plot and many other aspects (for a comprehensive model, see Van Laer, de Ruyter, Visconti, & Wetzels, 2014, p. 801 ). These differences are well documented in literature on narrative transportation (for a recent review, see Van Laer et al., 2014) . Taken together, these differences question how well it should relate to general visuo-spatial abilities.
As a measure of spatial perspective-taking we used the Tube Figures Test (TFT; Stumpf & Fay, 1983) , a well-established German test of general visuo-spatial intelligence. For instance, it is a mandatory part of the training of prospective pilots and physicians in Germany, as well as of many assessment centers in larger companies. On every trial, participants are presented with a long curved tube inside of a transparent cube, the original figure. Additionally, this original figure is simultaneously presented from another side (left, right, top, bottom, or behind) in a second picture, the target figure. Participants have to indicate the angle from which the target depicts the original figure. 1 The TFT is not a clear-cut measure of perspective-taking. It can alternatively be solved using object rotation strategies. Although dissociations between these different spatial abilities have been shown experimentally (see, e.g., Hamilton et al., 2009) , they are often highly correlated in psychometric tests (r > .80; Hegarty & Waller, 2004) . The TFT has the additional benefit that its stimulus material renders the use of non-spatial strategies unlikely-non-spatial strategies that can be applied to solve other visuo-spatial tests such as the mental rotation test (Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978) .
We predicted a positive correlation between performance in the TFT and the subscale PT but no other subscale of the IRI. We discuss the matter of object rotation versus perspective-taking within the TFT further in Study 3.
METhoD
Sample. N = 115 individuals (N = 80 female, N = 33 male, N = 2 missing; M age = 27, SD = 7) participated for €7. The study was the first part of a longer battery including other unrelated tasks (Topolinski, Erle, & Reber, 2015; Topolinski, Maschmann, Pecher, & Winkielman, 2014) . N = 4 participants were excluded due to below-chance performance in the TFT; the IRI data of N = 2 was lost due to technical problems.
Materials and Procedure.
Participants completed the German version of the IRI and the TFT in counterbalanced order.
2 Both tests were administered as stated in the respective manuals with the only difference that administration was computer-based.
1. Because the TFT is protected by copyright, we are not allowed to include pictures of the material. Comparable stimuli can be found at: http://www.testedich.de/quiz23/quiz/1179643508/ Raeumliches-Vorstellungsvermoegen.
2. The order of measurement was completely counterbalanced in the first three studies. Since across studies order did not affect any outcome, it is not discussed henceforth. IRI. The German version of the IRI consists of 16 items (4 for each subscale) and has a 5-point response scale (cf. Paulus, 2009 ). We use the aggregate scores for each of the scales as dependent variables.
TFT. Participants received a maximum of 21 TFT problems. They could work on each item self-paced but could not browse back to an earlier item. After 12 minutes, the task was automatically stopped (cf. Stumpf & Fay, 1983) . The number of correct answers is the main dependent variable of the TFT 3 but we also recorded mean response time.
RESulTS anD DIScuSSIon
Secondary Analyses. Table 1 shows the mean scores of all measures used across the present studies, and Table 2 their reliabilities (CR-α), which were poor to good in Study 1. Mean RT in the TFT correlated positively with performance, r(109) = .30, p = .001, 95% CI [.13, .50]: the longer it took participants to solve the task, the higher their overall performance was. 4 All subscales of the IRI were correlated with the total score, all rs(111) > .56, p < .001. Main Analysis and Discussion. As predicted, there was a significant positive correlation between visuo-spatial abilities and empathic perspectivetaking, r(107) = .20, p = .033, 95% CI [.02, .40] . Participants who performed better at the TFT indicated more empathic perspective-taking. The other subscales of the IRI, however, did not correlate with TFT performance, all |r|s(107) < .10, ps > .33. 3. The TFT manual suggests absolute number rather than the percentage of correct answers as the dependent variable of the test (Stumpf & Fay, 1983) . There was, however, a small number of people who did not complete all 21 items in time (15 out of 431 participants; 3.48%). The correlation between percentage of correct answers on the TFT and empathic PT was almost identical to the correlation between absolute number of correct answers and empathic PT (Study 1: r(107) = .22, p = .025; Study 2: r(118) = .20, p = .026; Study 3: r(165) = .22, p = .004; meta-analysis: r(394) = .21, p < .001).
4. Since accuracy and RT of the TFT were correlated, we also computed a partial correlation between spatial and empathic perspective-taking, controlling for the RT on the spatial perspectivetaking task. This correlation was almost identical to the bivariate correlation: Study 1: r(106) = .18, p = .063; Study 2: r(117) = .22, p = .014; Study 3: r(164) = .20, p = .009; meta-analysis: r(393) = .20, p < .001.
Given that the TFT is a measure of visuo-spatial intelligence, it might be possible that the present correlation simply means that more intelligent people are also more empathic. Study 2 ruled this out by establishing discriminative validity regarding another aspect of intelligence, namely numerical intelligence.
STudy 2
Study 1 was replicated with the inclusion of a measure of numerical intelligence, the "arithmetic problems" subscale from a well-established German IQ test (Liepmann, 2007) . We again expected to find a positive correlation between spatial abilities and empathic perspective-taking, a positive correlation between numerical intelligence and spatial abilities, but no correlation between numerical intelligence and empathic perspective-taking. We also expected no correlation between the remaining IRI subscales and either of the other tests.
METhoD
Sample. N = 147 individuals (N = 82 female, N = 38 male, N = 27 missing; M age = 26, SD = 8) participated for €10. The study was part of a longer battery including other unrelated tasks (Topolinski, 2014) . N = 1 participant was excluded due to below-chance performance on the TFT. Due to a programming error, IRI data were not recorded for N = 27 participants.
Materials and Procedure.
In addition to the tasks from Study 1, participants completed a series of 20 arithmetic problems. The task was selfpaced but terminated after ten minutes regardless of how many problems were solved until then. The dependent variable is the number of correctly solved problems (cf. Liepmann, 2007) . Participants were handed a pen and a blank sheet of paper for auxiliary calculations.
RESulTS anD DIScuSSIon
Secondary Analyses. Mean scores and reliabilities of the questionnaires can be found in Tables 1 and 2 In principle, it is possible to solve the TFT by two different strategies: (1) using actual perspective transformation, the test-taker rotates him or herself mentally to imagine what the object would look like from a different angle. In contrast, (2) using simple object rotation, the test-taker mentally rotates the target figure until it matches the orientation of the original reference figure (cf. Zacks & Michelon, 2005; Zacks et al., 2003) . Of course, our conceptual argumentation predicts that only perspective transformation but not object rotation should be correlated with empathic perspectivetaking because object rotation does not involve the self or the body schema (cf. Kessler & Rutherford, 2010; Kessler & Thomson, 2010) .
STudy 3
In this study, we assessed the strategy participants used to solve the TFT, and predicted that the observed correlation between empathic perspectivetaking and visuo-spatial ability would be greater for individuals performing perspective transformations than those using object rotation. However, there was no reason to assume that there will be no correlation at all for object-rotators because it has been shown that both strategies correlate substantially with each other (Hegarty & Waller, 2004) . To this end, Study 1 was replicated with an additional assessment of TFT strategy (see below and Appendix).
METhoD
Sample. N = 170 individuals (N = 122 female, N = 47 male, N = 1 missing; M age = 26, SD = 9) participated for €10. The study was part of a longer battery including other unrelated tasks (Topolinski, Boecker, Erle, Bakhtiari, & Pecher, 2015) . N = 2 participants were excluded because they performed below-chance level on the TFT. Data of N = 1 participant was lost due to technical problems.
Materials and Procedure. All procedural details were similar to Study 1. After the TFT, participants received definitions of perspective transformations and object rotations, respectively, and indicated whether they predominantly used one or the other strategy, a mixture of both, or a completely different strategy. Then participants rated their strategy on an 8-point scale ranging from 1 ("only object rotation") to 8 ("only perspective transformation"). Finally, participants freely described their strategy.
RESulTS anD DIScuSSIon
Secondary Analyses. Descriptive statistics and measurement properties of the questionnaires again can be found in Tables 1 and 2 Finally, we split the sample to compare the respective correlations for perspective-takers and object-rotators. We hypothesized that the correlation should be larger for people who report performing perspective transformations during the TFT. This was possible because we implemented a forced-choice 8-point strategy scale. N = 83 (60 female, 23 male) were classified as object-rotators (scores ≤ 4), whereas N = 86 (62 female, 24 male) were classified as perspective-takers (scores ≥ 5). The correlation between TFT performance and empathic perspective-taking was significant for the perspective-takers, r(83) = .29, p = .008, 95% CI [.08, .51], but not for the object-rotators, r(80) = .13, p = .25, 95% CI [-.09, .35], although these coefficients did not differ significantly, z = 1.06, p = .29.
As acknowledged before, the TFT is not a process-pure measure of spatial perspective-taking abilities because it can also be solved by means of object rotation. These correlations, however, suggest that the relation between the TFT and empathic perspective-taking might be stronger for people performing spatial perspective-taking during the TFT. Of course, the present data are far from conclusive on this matter because the correlations between the "perspective-takers" and "object-rotators" did not differ significantly. However, it is still noteworthy that the correlation between empathic perspective-taking and TFT performance was not statistically significant for the object-rotators.
There are also several reasons why these differences might be understated in the present study. First, the spatial abilities of object rotation and perspective transformation are distinct, yet highly correlated (see, e.g., Hegarty & Waller, 2004) . Second, since these abilities are so similar, potentially participants were confused by the similar definitions of object versus viewer rotation and this might have distorted self-reports of TFT strategy.
Given all this, it might be difficult to show differences between the two abilities using a correlational approach. Prior research has attempted a direct manipulation of object versus viewer rotation, although in a different setup (Wraga, Creem-Regehr, & Proffitt, 2004) . Potentially, future research implementing such a direct manipulation of TFT strategy can make a stronger case for the presently suggested distinction.
Since limiting participants' strategy during the TFT seemed quite difficult, the final study rather went on to generalize the correlation to a clearcut measure of visuo-spatial perspective-taking, which has been shown to critically depend on embodied self-rotation and to involve object rotation only to a lesser degree (cf. Kessler & Thomson, 2010) .
STudy 4
This experiment included both the German version of the IRI (Paulus, 2009 ) and a more direct measure of spatial perspective-taking from Kessler and Thomson (2010) . In this task, participants see a person sitting at a table with one object to his left and another object to his right. On every trial, one of these objects is the target. Participants have to indicate which hand the person in the picture would use to grab the target object. To do this, they have a left hand and a right hand response key. Kessler and Thomson (2010) demonstrated that the majority of participants solve this task by mentally transposing their body schema into the target's perspective (see also Kessler & Wang, 2012) . Therefore, task difficulty increases with angular disparity between the perspective-taker and the other person. The main dependent variable in this study was the mean RT over all trials. This task has the obvious advantage over perspective-taking instructions that it can be used to induce purely visual perspective-taking. Therefore, it is possible to tease apart visual and psychological simulation aspects that are inherently confounded when instructing participants "to visualize a person's [psychological] situation" (cf. Davis et al., 2004) .
Based on the results of the first three studies, we expected a positive correlation between participants' performance on the spatial perspective-taking task and their self-reported empathic perspective-taking (i.e., a negative correlation between mean RTs and empathic perspective-taking). The better participants are at visually understanding how the world looks visually for another person, the more inclined they should be to understanding how it "looks" psychologically. This is also in line with another study, where social skills (a construct similar to empathic perspective-taking; cf. Baron-Cohen et al., 2001 ) positively predicted performance on the visual perspective-taking task (Brunyé et al., 2012) . If, however, empathic and spatial perspective-taking were completely unrelated, there should be no correlation between this demand-free, process-pure, and objective measure of spatial perspective-taking and empathic perspective-taking.
METhoD
Sample. N = 163 psychology students at the University of Würzburg (N = 130 female, N = 33 male; M age = 21, SD = 4) participated for partial course credit. The study was the first part of a two-study package. Due to technical difficulties, the experiment froze for N = 8 participants before the visuospatial perspective-taking task (cf. Kessler & Thomson, 2010) , and those participants only completed demographics and the IRI. Therefore, the final sample consisted of N = 155 participants.
Materials and Procedure. Participants completed 80 trials (16 at 0, 40, 80, 120, and 160 degrees of angular disparity, respectively) of the spatial perspective-taking paradigm of Kessler and Thomson (2010) . Every trial began with the instructions to put the two index fingers on the response keys, and to sit straight and centered in front of the monitor. After one button press, participants were shown the target object of the trial. After another button press, the trial started with a fixation cross that was presented in the center of the screen for 500 milliseconds before it was replaced by the person at the table. Participants had to respond as fast and as accurately as possible but responded self-paced to the stimuli. When they pressed the wrong key, an error message appeared on the screen for five seconds. Later, they provided demographic information and completed the German version of the IRI (Paulus, 2009 ). All error trials (8.3%) were excluded from the RT analyses. The main analysis focuses on the mean RT over all remaining trials of the task, aggregated across levels of angular disparity.
RESulTS anD DIScuSSIon
Secondary Analyses. Descriptive statistics and measurement properties of the questionnaires again can be found in Tables 1 and 2 . Reliabilities were poor to good. Again, all IRI subscales correlated with its total score (all rs > .53, all ps < .001). On the spatial perspective-taking task, RTs increased with increasing angular disparity as indicated by a significant main effect, F(4, 148) = 19.68, p < .001, η p ² = .35, and linear trend, F(1, 151) = 76.18, p < .001, η p ² = .34. Thus, our stimulus materials (see Appendix) seem comparable to those used by Kessler and Thomson (2010) .
Main Analyses. We found a negative correlation between mean RT in the spatial perspective-taking task and empathic perspective-taking, r(153) = -.20, p = .013, 95% CI [-.04, -.36] , that is, a positive correlation between spatial and empathic perspective-taking abilities. The other IRI subscales were again uncorrelated with spatial perspective-taking (other |r|s < .12, ps ≥ .15).
This finding corroborates and extends the results from Studies 1-3 by showing that higher visual perspective-taking performance (i.e., lower RTs) correlates with higher dispositional levels of self-reported empathic perspective-taking. Prior research has shown that for the majority of participants, the task of Study 4 involves embodied self-transformation (Kessler & Wang, 2012), which we assume to be the shared mechanism between simulations of empathic and spatial perspective-taking. Therefore, Study 4 supports our general hypothesis more directly than the first three studies.
In prior research, social skills predicted the RT difference between low angular disparities, where no embodied self-rotation is necessary to solve the task, and high angular disparities, where it is (Brunyé et al., 2012) . Presently, there was only a relation between empathic perspective taking and overall RTs, which was comparable for low, r(153) = -.20, p = .012, 95% CI [-.04, -.36] , and high angular disparities, r(153) = -.18, p = .028, 95% CI [-.02, -.34] . This points to an important difference between social skills, as a measure of empathic "performance" and empathic perspective-taking, which is a self-report of willingness to engage in perspective-taking. Arguably, it makes sense to assume that motivation would predict RTs on all levels of angular disparity whereas skill differentiates at the levels with the highest difficulty. Of course, both Brunyé and colleagues' (2012) and our study did not include a direct manipulation of participants' body posture (for such manipulations in other social phenomena see, e.g., Sparenberg, Topolinski, Springer, & Prinz, 2012; Topolinski, 2010; , which limits the interpretability of angular disparity differences in terms of mental self-rotation.
MeTa-analySiS: gender effeCTS and effeCT-SizeS
Since the observed effects in our studies are rather small, we also computed a meta-analytic correlation over all three studies using the TFT with a resulting sample size of N = 396. This correlation was identical to that of the individual studies, r(394) = .21, p < .001, 95% CI [.11, .31 ]. The confidence interval informs us about the small, yet reliable, effect size of our studies in the most accurate way.
Importantly, there was only a small number of male participants in all individual studies, which made it difficult to inspect gender effects individually. The meta-analysis allows us to draw conclusions about potential gender effects with higher accuracy. Gender has been shown to be related to both empathic (Davis, 1980; Davis & Kraus, 1991) and visuo-spatial perspective-taking performance (Brunyé et al., 2012; Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983) , and mental self-rotation during visuo-spatial perspective-taking tasks specifically (Kessler & Wang, 2012) . If the observed correlation were stronger for women than for men, the present results would overstate the true overall correlation, which would limit the implications of the observed effects, given their as-of-now small effect size. Alternatively, if the observed correlation were stronger for men than for women, the presently observed correlations might understate the true overall correlation. We computed separate meta-analytic correlations for women and men to look at this.
Although the resulting correlations were both significant, r(110) = .36, p < .001, 95% CI [.18, .56] for male; and r(281) = .13, p = .028, 95% CI [.01, .25] for female participants, respectively, the correlation for male participants was significantly stronger, Z = -2.13, p = .033. This mirrors results of Brunyé and colleagues (2012) , who found that the relation between social skills, a related construct, and visuo-spatial perspective-taking is stronger for men than for women.
For Study 4, which used a different visuo-spatial measure, the correlation between visuo-spatial and empathic perspective-taking for men, r(30) = -.29, p = .105, 95% CI [-.66, .06], was nominally higher than for women, r(121) = -.17, p = .060, 95% CI [-.35, .01] . Although both individual correlations, as well as their difference (Z = 0.62, p = .535), were not statistically significant, they were in the predicted direction, which is in line with Studies 1-3, as well as prior research (Brunyé et al., 2012) . The lack of gender effects in this study could be due to differences between social skills and empathic perspective-taking. Alternatively, it could be a function of the rather small number of male participants in our study, combined with the much smaller number of visuo-spatial perspective-taking trials (80 vs. 672 trials in Brunyé et al., 2012) .
These additional analyses shed some light on the magnitude of the observed correlations and that the true correlation might actually be understated in the present report, because our samples were predominantly female. Furthermore, the not always satisfactory reliabilities could limit the magnitude of the present correlations. The attenuation corrected correlations (cf. Amelang & Schmidt-Atzert, 2006 ) of our studies equal r' = .32, r' = .27, and r' = .29, respectively. Interestingly, overall reliability of the empathic perspective-taking subscale (CR-α = .76 for female, and CR-α = .82 for male participants, respectively), and especially the TFT (CR-α = .57 for female, and CR-α = .71 for male participants, respectively), was lower for women than for men, which also contributes to the smaller correlation for female participants.
On the other hand, there are also some reasons to believe that the correlations should be small in general. For instance, whereas visuo-spatial perspective-taking is determined mostly by skill, empathic perspectivetaking is always a function of skill and motivation, although these components should be strongly related. The wording of the items of the subscale PT more closely refers to the motivational aspect of empathic perspectivetaking, that is, the willingness to engage in empathic perspective-taking rather than to the eventual success of the process (although the original author assumed that PT measures both, see Davis, 1983, p. 115) . This provides another threshold of shared variance that can be accounted for between visuo-spatial and empathic perspective-taking as measured with the IRI. Finally, it is unclear how many participants performed perspective transformations in our first two studies. The highest correlation was found for the alleged perspective-takers in Study 3 but this estimate is based on retrospective report, which can be problematic (cf. Schwarz et al., 1994) . On top of this, it seems appropriate to assume that people engaged in multiple processes during the TFT.
Taken together, there are both reasons to assume that the true correlation between empathic and visuo-spatial perspective-taking should be higher and lower in the general population. These biases notwithstanding, we found a small, yet stable correlation across the whole sample and all subsamples in this meta-analysis, which gives us confidence in the generalizability of this correlation to other measures of empathic perspective-taking (cf. Brunyé et al., 2012; Kessler & Wang, 2012) .
general diSCuSSion
Bridging the theorizing of two, until now separated fields of study, the social psychology of empathy and the perceptual-cognitive psychology of visuo-spatial perspective-taking, the present studies establish a dispositional link between empathic perspective-taking and visuo-spatial abilities that is specific to the faculty of spatial perspective-taking and not (visuospatial) intelligence in general. Our research shows that at least some variance is shared between empathic and spatial perspective-taking and we believe that contemplating how someone feels often automatically entails a simulation of that person's viewpoint, too. This assumption is contrary to the strong dissociation between visual (imagery) perspective-taking and empathic perspective-taking . As mentioned in the introduction, it seems quite impossible to instruct exclusively psychological simulations of another person's situation without any visual input or the other way around. However, spatial perspective-taking paradigms as in Kessler and Thomson (2010) give us exactly this opportunity because there is only one way of solving them. For instance, it is conceivable that having participants adopt the perspective of a target person spatially (as in Kessler & Thomson, 2010) would result in higher empathy for this person. In this case, we could be certain that the simulation that caused the psychological self-other merging was purely visual because the spatial perspective-taking paradigm demands this specific simulation. In prior research, which has demonstrated various benefits of direct instructions to empathize, for instance, stereotype reduction (e.g., Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) or increased helping (e.g., Batson et al., 2002; Batson, Sager, et al., 1997) , the visual and psychological simulation aspect is inherently confounded. In addidition, the verbal nature of the materials makes it possible for participants to respond to these paradigms without actually taking the perspective of the target at all. Replicating classic perspective-taking instruction effects with subtle, nonverbal, and demand-free spatial perspective-taking inductions seems like a promising future research avenue.
Another question for future research is what happens when the causality is turned around. Is it more difficult to adopt the visual perspective of a person that we do not want to empathize with? Prior research has shown that empathic perspective-taking is immediately ineffective when the tar-get is a member of a highly stigmatized group such as murderers (see Batson, Polycarpou et al., 1997, Experiment 3) . However, empathic perspective-taking had an effect after one week. Since visual perspective-taking only happens in the here and now, visual perspective taking for murderers could be more difficult than for other stigmatized (see Batson, Polycarpou et al., 1997 , Experiments 1 and 2) or non-stigmatized targets.
If such a uni-or bidirectional causal relation between visuo-spatial and empathic or psychological perspective-taking were to be found, future research should return to connect this knowledge with the existing findings on the mechanisms following perspective simulations. For instance, it seems reasonable to assume that visually caused perspective-taking resembles more closely the imagine-self perspective (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Davis et al., 2004) , because only this kind of perspective-taking asks participants to "put themselves in the shoes of another person"-a feat which is quite literally achieved by the visuo-spatial manipulation by Kessler and Thomson (2010) . An interesting question is, whether there is also a relation with imagine-other perspective-taking instructions. Such a distinction should manifest itself especially on the personal distress that is felt after perspective-taking, that is, visuo-spatially induced perspectivetaking should have a stronger emotional signature than the imagine-other perspective-taking instruction (cf. Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Lamm et al., 2007) .
One alternative explanation that should be tested in future research is that the observed correlation between empathic and spatial perspective stems from the strong metaphorical overlap (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) . People might interpret the IRI questions as referring also to visual kinds of perspective-taking and therefore match their responses to what they know about their visuo-spatial capabilities. Note, however, that also this alternative account implies a close relation between the two types of perspectivetaking.
This article is the first to show a dispositional link between spatial perspective-taking abilities and self-reported empathic perspective-taking. Instead of arbitrarily differentiating psychological self-other merging from the embodied self-other merging that happens during spatial perspectivetaking, we unite the two constructs at a mechanistic level. Simulations of psychological perspectives are grounded in simulations of the spatial perspective of another social agent. Of course, the fact that both kinds of perspective taking are subserved by the same mechanism begs the important question whether improving this mechanism alone is sufficient to increase the rate at which people engage in perspective-taking. If this were the case, people could practice visuo-spatial perspective-taking to improve their social skills. Potentially, even a dispositional lack of empathy such as in autism (Hamilton et al., 2009 ) might benefit from long-term training in visuo-spatial abilities. (Stumpf & Fay, 1983 ) and the Arithmetic Problems subscale of the IST (Liepmann, 2007 ) cannot be shared online. Although we translated our German materials as precisely as possible, the English translations are not always verbatim.
InTERPERSonal REacTIVITy InDEx (IRI; STuDIES 1-4)
The German version of the IRI consists of only 16 items (cf. Paulus, 2009) . Each subscale consists of four items, which are presented in a fixed order. The scale labels were 1 = nie (never), 2 = selten (rarely), 3 = manchmal (sometimes), 4 = oft (often), and 5 = immer (always). Table 1 shows the original German items and their corresponding item within the original IRI (Davis, 1983) in italics. Notes. Ec = Empathic concern. fS = fantasy. PD = Personal Distress. PT = Perspective-Taking.
TuBE fIGuRE TEST STRaTEGy aSSESSMEnT (STuDy 3) Table 2 shows the original German instructions of the TFT strategy assessment and an English translation. The analyses in the paper focused on the eight-point scale answers because those provided higher statistical power in comparison to the nominal four-point scale and because the free answers often were unclear about which strategy was used (e.g., "I imagined how the object looked after the rotation"). We refrained from using the term perspective-taking in our questions because we were concerned that participants might guess the purpose of the study. Also, we wanted to emphasize the contrast between the two studies by using the same terminology (self vs. object rotation). our participants mainly report two strategies: 1. you can rotate the second tubular figure until it visually matches the first. That means you rotate the object and not yourself and thereby you achieve a match between the first and the second figure. 2. you can also imagine how the first figure would look if you yourself would stand to its left, its right, above it, below it or behind it. That means you imagine how the object would look from another perspective. here, you rotate yourself to come up with the correct solution. Please indicate which of these strategies applies best to you.
Skala: (1) objekt drehen, (2) Selbst drehen, (3) Eine Mischung, (4) Eine andere Strategie Scale: (1) object rotation, (2) self rotation, (3) mixture of (1) & (2), (4) other strategy Eight-point strategy assessment falls Sie eine Mischung der beiden Strategien verwendet haben, können Sie diese hier noch spezifizieren.
In case you used a mixture of the two strategies, please specify the amount to which you used the two strategies. finally, you now have the opportunity to freely describe the strategy that you used (for instance if you indicated using a completely different strategy). Please specify in as much detail as possible how you solved the visual puzzles! Please also describe your strategy if you used one of the two strategies which we defined earlier, as this is also interesting for us. as we said: not your performance, but the strategy within this task is of interest to us.
